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International Business Communication and Free 
Speech: Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Baldridge 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since 1945, Arab states l have refused to trade with Israel. 2 In addition to this 
primary boycott, Arab states have also refused to trade with foreign companies 
doing business with IsraeJ.3 Arab states enforce this secondary boycott by re-
quiring such companies to certify that they have no business relationships with 
Israel. 4 
To oppose these trade practices, the United States enacted legislationS pro-
hibiting U.S. persons6 from complying with the Arab boycott. Currently, the 
Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985 (EAA)1 prohibits U.S. firms 
from disclosing to boycotting states their business relationships with a boycotted 
state friendly to the U.S.8 In particular, Commerce Department regulations 
prohibit U.S. firms from responding to an Arab state's questionnaire regarding 
the firm's business relationships with Israel.9 
In 1982, a U.S. corporation challenged the constitutionality of these antiboy-
cott laws. 1o The Briggs and Stratton Corporation I I argued that regulations 
enacted pursuant to the EAA's antiboycott provisions violated its first amend-
ment right to free speech. 12 The Federal District Court for the Eastern District 
1 This Comment focuses on those states which are members of the Arab League. See infra note 15. 
2 See A. LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL ENDS 1,313 (1983). 
'Id.at314. 
4 [d. at 315-17. 
5 See, e.g., The Export Administration Amendments of 1979, § 8(a), 50 U.S.c. § 2407(a) (1982) 
[hereinafter cited as EAAJ. For a history of U.S. antiboycott legislation, see infra text accompanying 
notes 35-58. 
6 Regulations enacted pursuant to the EAA define "U.S. persons" as "any person who is a United 
States resident or national, including individuals, domestic concerns, and controlled in fact foreign 
subsidiaries, ·affiliates, or other permanent foreign establishments of domestic concerns." 15 C.F.R. 
§ 369.I(b)(l) (1984) [hereinafter U.S. persons referred to are cited as U.S. firms]. 
'The Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-64, 99 Stat. 120 (1985). 
This law reenacted verbatim the antiboycott provisions of the EAA. The current EAA is set to expire 
on September 30, 1989. 
850 U.S.C. § 2407(a)I(D). 
9 See 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(d)5(iii) (1984). 
10 See Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Baldridge, 539 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Wis. 1982). For a discussion of 
legal challenges to the EAA, see infra text accompanying notes 78-10 I. 
II Hereinafter referred to as Briggs. For additional information about the corporation, see infra 
note 102. 
12 Briggs & Stratton, 539 F. Supp. at 1317. Briggs argued initially that the regulations violated its 
commercial speech rights. Three months later, Briggs moved for reconsideration, arguing that the 
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of Wisconsin, however, granted summary judgment against the company.13 In 
1984, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the 
district court. 14 This Comment examines those decisions. 
This Comment begins by reviewing the Arab boycott against Israel. Next, the 
Comment discusses the U.S. government's response. The Comment then sum-
marizes the facts, arguments, and holdings in the Briggs cases. Finally, the 
Comment analyzes the Briggs decisions, suggesting that the corporation's pro-
posed communication should not have been judged by commercial speech 
standards. The Comment notes that, even if commercial speech standards were 
appropriate, they were incorrectly applied in the Briggs cases. The Comment 
concludes that a more precise definition of commercial speech is necessary to 
preserve full first amendment protection for conventional speech by commercial 
speakers. 
II. HISTORY: THE ARAB BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL, THE U.S. LEGISLATIVE 
RESPONSE, AND LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE EAA 
A. The Arab Boycott of Israel 
As early as 1945, the League of Arab States I5 recommended that its members 
refuse to import "Zionist" products. 16 A December 1945 resolution of the Arab 
regulations violated its conventional speech rights. See Briggs & Stratton Corp., 544 F. Supp 667, 668 
(E.D. Wis. 1982). The district court held that Briggs' communication involved commercial speech, 
making it "unnecessary to resolve whether the plaintiff's conventional speech rights were abridged." 
Id. at 668. Further, the court held that, if conventional speech rights were an issue, it would find "no 
constitutional intrusion." Id. The following year, the Trane Company unsuccessfully challenged the 
same regulations on conventional speech grounds. See Trane Co. v. Baldridge, 552 F. Supp. 1378 
(W.O. Wis. 1983). Appeals by Trane and Briggs were consolidated and heard by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. See Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Baldridge, 728 F.2d 915 (7th 
Cir. 1984), art. denied 105 S.Ct. 105, 106 (1984). 
13 Briggs & Stratton, 539 F. Supp. at 1307. 
14 Briggs & Stratton. 728 F.2d 915, 916 (7th Cir. 1984). 
15 Syria, Transjordan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Egypt agreed in 1944 to form a league of independent 
Arab states (hereinafter referred to as Arab League). A. LOWENFELD, supra note 2, at 310. The purpose 
of the League was "to strengthen and consolidate the ties which bind all Arab countries." Id. (citing 
Alexandria Protocol of October 7, 1944, INDEX TO MULTILATERAL TREATIES 105 (Y. Mostecky, 
Ed.)(1965)). See also H. HASSOVNA, THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES AND REGIONAL DISPUTES (1975). These 
five Arab nations also agreed to establish a permanent Council. A. LOWENFELD, supra note 2, at 310. 
In 1945, a General Arab Conference was held in Cairo where the Pact of the League of Arab States 
was signed on behalf of the Alexandria Protocol nations plus Saudi Arabia and Yemen. A. LOWENFELD, 
supra note 2, at 311. Under the Pact, any independent Arab state had the right to become a League 
member. /d. 
By the Summer of 1982,20 states had joined the Arab League (in order of ratification): Transjordan, 
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen Arab Republic, Syria, Libya, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, 
Kuwait, Algeria, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, United Arab Emir-
ates, Mauritania, and Somalia. /d. at 311 n.g. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was given 
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League CouncijI7 stated that Jewish products manufactured in Palestine were 
undesirable because their importation would further Zionist political objec-
tives. Is This resolution, along with other Council recommendations, 19 comprised 
the primary boycott of Israel, banning Arab trade with Israel, Israeli companies, 
and Israeli nationals. 20 
In the 1950s, the Arab League extended this boycott, banning trade with 
non-Israeli companies and individuals who advanced the economic or military 
strength of IsraeJ.2I To enforce this secondary boycott, the Arab League devel-
oped a blacklist of these Israeli supporters. 22 The League's secondary boycott 
was followed by a tertiary boycott, prohibiting trade with companies doing 
business with those subject to the secondary boycott. 23 
full voting status in 1976. ld. Egypt's membership was suspended in March. 1979, after the signing of 
the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty modeled on the Camp David accords. [d. 
16 A. LOWENFELD, supra note 2, at 313. 
17 Arab League Council, Resolution No. 16, December 16, 1945, quoted in A.LoWENFELD, supra note 
2, at 313. See also M. KHALIL, 2 THE ARAB STATES AND THE ARAB LEAGUE, A DOCUMENTARY RECORD 
(1962). 
18 See A. LOWENFELD, supra note 2, at 313. 
19 For example, in June 1976, the Council advised that the trade ban include "Zionist" services, and 
that each Arab state create its own boycott office. /d. 
20 Hirschhorn & Fenton, States' Rights and the Antiboycott Provisions of the Export Administration Act, 20 
COLUM. J. TRANSNT'L L. 517, 518 (1981). 
21 [d. 
22 Williams, U.S. Regulation of Arab Boycott Practices, 10 LAW & POL'y INT'L Bus. 815, 818 (1978). A 
firm may be blacklisted for conducting any of the following business activities: maintaining manufac-
turing or assembly plants in Israel, or licensing arrangements with Israeli companies; exploring for 
natural resources in Israel; making substantial investments in Israeli concerns or conducting joint 
ventures with Israeli partners; lending money for Israeli industrial, military or agricultural projects; 
insuring commercial or industrial Israeli companies; making routine stops at Israeli ports. Ludwig & 
Smith, The Business Effects of the Antiboycott Provisions of the Export Administration Act Amendments of [977 
- Morality Plus Pragmatism Equals Complexity, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 581, 582 n.2 (1978). 
Grounds for blacklisting foreign companies originated in the Arab League's Central Boycott Office 
(CBO). See infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. One commentator has noted that current grounds 
for blacklisting include the failure to reply to a CBO questionnaire asking a firm about its business 
relationships with Israel. Williams, supra, at 819. Briggs believes it was blacklisted for this reason. See 
text accompanying notes 115 and 116. 
While estimates of the total number of firms on the blacklist vary widely, one commentator has 
noted that as many as 15,000 enterprises may have been on Arab blacklists, including 1,500 firms 
based in the United States. See A. LOWENFELD, supra note 2, at 318-19. A sample of U.S.-based firms 
as compiled by Guzzardi, That Curious Barrier on the Arab Frontiers, 92 FORTUNE, 82, 85 (1975), showed 
Coca-Cola, Ford Motur, Monsanto, Sears,Roebuck, United Artists, and Xerox as among those boycotted 
by Arab nations. [d. 
23 Hirschhorn & Fenton, supra note 20, at 518. For example, an Arab nation would be prohibited 
from dealing with a non-Israeli firm (the secondary level) which had subcontracted with a blacklisted 
firm (the tertiary level). Ludwig & Smith, supra note 22, at 582 n.2. For a discussion of tertiary boycott 
practices, see also Williams, supra note 22, at 820-21. Williams notes the problems faced by a non-
blacklisted American bus manufacturer(secondary level) whose contract to sell buses to Saudi Arabia 
was jeopardized by its use of bus seats produced by a blacklisted firm (tertiary level). [d. 
In the Briggs case, Syria refused a non-blacklisted Syrian distributor's request for an import license 
because the distributor was supplied by Briggs whose name appeared on a blacklist. See Briggs & 
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In May 1951, the Arab League established a Central Boycott Office (CBO) in 
Damascus to coordinate administration of the boycott.24 Currently, the CBO 
serves as headquarters for the boycott offices of Arab League members, and 
holds meetings for blacklist changes.2s The CBO also circulates questionnaires 
and gathers information to determine whether to blacklist foreign firms.26 The 
CBO blacklist names companies with whom Arab states should not do business.27 
In order to maintain and enforce the blacklist, Arab countries routinely require 
firms seeking to do business in Arab countries to furnish relevant information.2s 
Arab states boycotting Israel assert that their boycott activities are governed 
by the CBOs "General Principles."29 League members are free, however, to 
select their own boycott principles. 3D Further, the CBO's own recommendations 
for blacklisting do not always conform to the published principles.31 
The 1973-74 Arab oil embargo heightened the significance of the Arab boy-
cott of Israel.32 Arab nations spent much of their new oil profits on internal 
Stratton, 539 F. Supp. at 1310. For additional facts of the Briggs case, see infra notes 102-115 and 
accompanying text. 
24 Arab League Council Resolution No. 357, May 19, 1951, cited in A. LOWENFELD, supra note 2, at 
313. 
25 See Williams, supra note 22, at 818. 
26 [d. at 819. 
27 Hirschhorn & Fenton, supra note 20, at 518. 
28 Ludwig & Smith, supra note 22, at 582 n.2. Briggs supplied the Syrian distributor with replacement 
parts for Briggs engines. Accordingly, the Syrian government asked the distributor to forward a 
questionnaire that inquired as to Briggs' business ties to Israel. For additional facts, see infra text 
accompanying notes 104-16. 
29 See Trane Co. v. Baldridge, 552 F. Supp. 1378, 1381 (W.D. Wis. 1983). These principles have 
been codified as HEAD OFFICE FOR BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL, GENERAL SECRETARIAT, LEAGUE OF ARAB 
COUNTRIES, GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL (June 1972) reprinted in 2 CONFERENCE ON 
TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC BOYCOTTS AND COERCION, MATERIALS ON THE ARAB OIL-PRODUCING NA-
TIONS BOYCOTT I, 17 (1978) [hereinafter cited as General Principles]. The Arab League first codified 
principles for the boycott of Israel in 1954. Williams, supra note 22, at 819. 
30 [d. at 820. For example, Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, and Tunisia are only 
involved in the primary boycott and do not blacklist foreign companies. [d. This fragmented response 
means that some corporations are able to continue trading with both Israel and various Arab nations. 
This explains why Briggs and the government stipulated that Briggs "has in the past and intends in 
the future to trade with persons in Israel and in all other respects [to] conduct its business without 
regard to [the Arab League's] 'General Principles.'" See Brief In Support Of Plaintiffs Motion For 
Summary Judgment at 12, Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Baldridge, 539 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D Wis. 1982). 
31 [d. at 819. For example, Xerox Corporation was blacklisted for sponsoring a television series 
which featured an episode considered too sympathetic to Israel. [d. 
" Hirschhorn & Fenton, supra note 20, at 518. One commentator, however, has noted that the 
impact of the Arab boycott is difficult to gauge. See A. LOWENFELD, supra note 2, at 335. Regarding its 
impact on Israel, "much of it rests on the 'might have been.'" [d. Regarding U.S. firms, while 1,500 
are believed to be on blacklists, it is not precisely known how many more firms have refused to trade 
with Israel in order to avoid being blacklisted and to maintain commercial relationships with Arab 
nations. [d. at 318-19. 
One example of a company that appears to have been influenced by the Arab boycott is Kleinwort 
Benson, an English underwriter. Lowenfeld noted that this firm excluded blacklisted underwriters 
from participating in the underwriting of a major Japanese trading corporation. [d. at 325-26 (citing 
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development, creating intense competition among Western firms for Arab busi-
ness, thereby increasing the leverage of Arab nations to enforce the boycott.33 
These developments led to lobbying in the United States for stronger legislation 
against the Arab boycott.34 
B. The U.S. Legislative Response 
The 1965 amendments35 to the Export Control Act of 194936 marked the first 
official U.S. response to the Arab boycott of Israel. 37 The 1965 legislation 
established a policy of opposition to boycotts of countries friendly to the United 
States.38 Additionally, the new law required exporters to inform the Commerce 
Department of any requests they received to comply with a foreign boycott.39 
Although the Commerce Department required U.S. firms to report receipt of 
these boycott-related requests, it did not prohibit firms from furnishing infor-
mation pursuant to such requests. 40 
For the next ten years, the U.S. antiboycott policy received little further 
attention from Congress or the AdministrationY In early 1975, however, Con-
gress began to investigate various aspects of the Arab boycott.42 Simultaneously, 
Jewish organizations filed lawsuits against executive agencies for failing to im-
The Arabs blacklist some Jewish banks, 2368 Bus. WK., February 17. 1975. at 26.27; The broad dimensions 
of the Arab blacklist. 2369 Bus. WK. February 24. 1975. at 25. 26). 
"ld. at 518-19. 
34 See text accompanying notes 42-43. 
35 Act of June 30. 1965. Pub. L. No. 89-63. 79 Stat. 209 (1965) (amending 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2021-
32) [hereinafter cited as 1965 amendments]. 
36 The Export Control Act of 1949. ch. 11.63 Stat. 7 (1949) (as amended. 50 U.S.c. app. §§ 2021-
32 (1964) (expired 1969». This act was replaced by the Export Administration Act of 1969. Pub. L. 
No. 91-184. 83 Stat. 841(codified at 50 U.S.c. app §§ 2401-13 (1976) (expired 1979)}. 
37 Hirshhorn & Fenton. supra note 20. at 519. 
38 See § 3(a}. Act of June 30. 1965. Pub. L. No. 89-63. 79 Stat. 209 (1965) (amending U.S.C. app 
§§ 2021-32). 
39 See id. at § 4. 
40 Hirschhorn & Fenton. supra note 20. at 520. 
41 Williams. supra note 22. at 825. 
42 On July 10. 1975. Representative John E. Moss. asked the director of the Office of Export 
Administration for copies of boycott-request reports filed by U.S. firms. A. LOWENFELD. supra note 2. 
at 336. The director and Secretary of Commerce Rogers Morton denied the request. /d. By a vote of 
ten to five. the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce held the Secretary in contempt of Congress. /d. Prior to a vote before the full 
House committee. an accomodation was reached. and the subcommittee was allowed to examine the 
reports.ld. at 337. 
This controversy was significant in bringing two ideas to public and congressional attention. First. 
it became clear that many U.S. firms were not revealing in the reports whether they had complied 
with the Arab boycott. ld. Second. it became known that the Commerce Department was promoting 
commercial opportunities with Arab nations in circulars which did not mention the 1965 antiboycott 
policy.ld. 
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plement congressional antiboycott policy.43 Responding to President Ford's pub-
lic statements attacking religious discrimination,44 the Commerce Department 
revised the Export Administration Regulations.45 
The new regulations were the first U.S. laws actually prohibiting U.S. firms 
from supporting boycotts against friendly nations.46 Yet the regulations only 
prohibited support of foreign trade practices that discriminated against U.S. 
citizens on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.4' The 
regulations did not prohibit U.S. firms from supporting boycotts which asked 
questions concerning their business relationships with Israel.4s 
Anticipating the expiration of the Export Administration Act of 1969,49 Con-
gress began to rewrite the legislation in 1976.50 The House and Senate passed 
separate bills,51 but the Senate failed to call for a conference. 52 While no new 
law was passed, the 1969 Act was extended by executive order. 53 In 1977, a 
new, compromise version of the EAA was introducedY The bill passed both 
43 Williams, supra note 22, at 825-26. 
44 On March 4, 1975, President Ford became the first U.S. president to issue a statement on the 
Arab boycott of Israel. The President stated: 
I am exercising my discretionary authority under the Export Administration Act to direct 
the Secretary of Commerce to issue amended regulations to: I. prohibit U.S. exporters and 
related service organizations from answering or complying in any way with boycott requests 
that would cause discrimination against U.S. citizens or firms on the basis of race, color, 
religion, sex or national origin .... 
See 2 CONFERENCE ON TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC BOYCOTTS AND COERCION, MATERIALS ON THE ARAB 
OIL-PRODUCING NATIONS BOYCOTT I, 136 (1978). 
45 See 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(a) (1976). 
46 See Hirschorn & Fenton, supra note 20, at 520. 
47 See generally 15 C.F.R. § 369.2 (1977). For example, "exporters and related service organizations" 
(§ 369.2(a» could not answer a questionnaire as to whether a U.S. firm was owned or controlled by 
Jews, or whether Jews served on its board of directors(§ 369.2(b». 
48 See 15 C.F.R. § 369.3 (1977). Exporters & related service organizations were "encouraged and 
requested" to refuse to answer questions regarding an exporter's business affairs with a boycotted 
country. [d. at § 369.3(b) (1977). 
49 See supra note 31. 
50 Hirschhorn & Fenton, supra note 20, at 520-21. See also Extension of the Export Administration 
Act of 1969, Part I: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Trade & Commerce, House 
Committee on International Relations, 94th Congress, 1st Session (1976); Extension of the Export 
Administration Act of 1969, Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcommitte on International Trade & 
Commerce, House Comm. on Int'l Rela., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1976). 
51 The House passed H.R. 15377 by a vote of 318-63 on September 22, 1976, while the Senate 
passed a companion bill, S. 3084. House Comm. on Int'l Rela., Export Administration Amendments 
of 1977, H.R. Rep. No. 95-190, 95th Cong.,.lst Sess. 2, reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Congo & Ad. News 
362-63. 
52 /d. 
53 In order to maintain authority to regulate exports, the President extended the 1969 Act by 
executive order on September 30, 1976. Exec. Order No. 11940. 3 C.F.R. 150 (1976), reprinted in 50 
U.S.C. § 2403 (1976) (revoked by Exec. Order No. 12002,3 C.F.R. 133 (1978». 
54 H.R. Rep. No. 95-190, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Congo & Ad. News 
363. The compromise was written primarily in a series of negotiations between a subcommittee of the 
Business Roundtable, composed of the chief executives of 180 major U.S. corporations, and the 
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houses in June, 1977,55 and was enacted as the Export Administration Amend-
ments of 1977.56 Implementing regulations were promulgated by the Commerce 
Department in 1978.57 The 1977 legislation was subsequently reenacted verba-
tim by the EAA of 1979.58 
The current antiboycott provisions of the EAA instruct the President to issue 
regulations prohibiting any U.S. firm in interstate or foreign commerce from 
taking actions with the intent to comply with, further, or support any boycott 
imposed by a foreign country against a country friendly to the United States.59 
As implemented by the Commerce Department, six general categories of actions 
are prohibited: refusals to do business; discriminatory actions; furnishing in-
formation about race, religion, sex, or national origin; furnishing information 
about business relationships; furnishing information about associations with 
charitable organizations; and implementing letters of credit with prohibited 
conditions or requirements.6o 
The Commerce Department regulations, enacted pursuant to the 1979 EAA, 
prohibit U.S. firms from furnishing information about their business relation-
ships with or in a boycotted country.61 This prohibition includes information 
regarding business relationships with any business concerns organized under 
the laws of the boycotted country, any national or resident of the boycotted 
country, or any person known or believed to be blacklisted by the boycotting 
country.62 The prohibition applies to any type of business relationship or trans-
representatives of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, a Jewish organization dedicated to 
combatting anti-semitism. See A. LOWENFELD, supra note 2, at 345. 
55 The agreement between the two groups was subsequently accepted by both the Carter adminis-
tration and the relevant Congressional committees. The Senate Banking Currency and Housing 
Committee adopted the bill 90-1 (123 Congo Rec. 13812 (May 5, 1977)), while the appropriate House 
Committee adopted the bill by a vote of 364-43 (123 Congo Rec. 11450 (April 20, 1977». The 
Conference Report was adopted by voice vote of the Senate (123 Congo Rec. 17832 (June 7, 1977» 
and by a vote of 306-41 in the House (123 Congo Rec. 18382 (June 10, 1977». 
56 Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, 91 Stat. 235 (1977) (amending 
the Export Administration Act of 1969, current version at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-20 (1982». 
57 See 15 C.F.R. § 369 (1978). The regulations begin by defining key terms in the statutory language 
including "U.S. person," "Activities in the Interstate or Foreign Commerce of the U.S.," and "Intent." 
!d. at § 369.I(b), (d) and (e). Next, the regulations set out six general categories of prohibited actions. 
!d. at § 369.2(a)-(f)(i); see infra text accompanying note 60. The regulations also provide for exceptions 
to the prohibitions, such as allowing a U.S. firm to comply with the import requirements of a boycotting 
country.ld. at § 369.3(a-I). The regulations establish a prohibition against evasion (§ 369.4) and require 
U.S. firms to report receipt of a request to take action which furthers a boycott (§ 369.6). 
58 The Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (codified at 50 U.S.C. 
app. §§ 2401-20 (1982». 
59 50 U.S.C. § 2407(a)(I) (1979). 
60 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(a)-(f) (1979). 
61 ld. at § 369.2(d)(1). 
621d. The prohibition does not apply to the furnishing of "normal business information in a 
commercial context." ld. at § 369.2(d)(3). The regulations describe this type of information as relating 
to "financial fitness, technical competence, or professional experience." ld. Such information can be 
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action, including sale, purchase, supply or transportation transactions, legal or 
commercial representations, insurance, and investment.63 Such information can-
not be furnished either upon the direct or indirect request of another person 
or upon the initiative of the U.S. firm.54 
The prohibitions only apply to acts undertaken with intent to comply with, 
further, or support an unsanctioned foreign boycott.65 Such intent exists when 
the boycott is one of the reasons for the decision to furnish the information.66 
The reason or purpose for furnishing the information can be proved by cir-
cumstantial evidence.67 For example, if a U.S. firm receives a request to supply 
boycott information, and then knowingly supplies it, that firm "clearly intends 
to comply with that boycott request."68 If the U.S. person knows information is 
sought for boycott purposes, the requisite intent is presumed.69 
The Commerce Department provides hypothetical examples of conduct pro-
hibited under the regulations. 70 Some examples describe situations where the 
communication does not disclose a firm's business relationships, but is prohibited 
because the underlying motivation was boycott-related. In one scenario, even 
though a firm has merely furnished normal business information, such activity 
is prohibited because the request for information was accompanied by a ques-
tionnaire from a boycott office.7! In another situation, furnishing normal busi-
found in publicly available documents including annual reports, disclosure statements concerning 
securities, catalogs, promotional brochures, and trade and business handbooks. [d. This type of infor-
mation may be furnished even if it could be used for boycott purposes. [d. at § 369.2(d)(4). For 
example, an Arab nation could decide to prevent the flow to Israel of some particular technical 
expertise. The Arab nation would then ask all U.S. firms who wish to do business in the country to 
declare to customs officials the nature of their expertise. Under the regulations, U.S. firms may furnish 
"technical competence" information as long as they have no reason to know the request is not boycott-
based. [d. at § 369.2(d)(2); see also text accompanying notes 64-69. The customs officials could then 
forward the information to the boycott office, who in turn would blacklist U.S. firms who had the 
technical expertise essential to Israel. See also § 369.2(d)(5)(xiii). 
63 !d. at § 369.2(d)2. 
64 !d. at § 369.2(d)(2). 
65 [d. at § 369.1(e)(3). 
66 !d. at § 369.1(e)2. The fact that other legitimate business reasons for the action are also present 
will not preclude a finding of intent. !d. 
67 [d. at § 369.1(e)(5). 
68 [d. at § 369.2(e)(5). 
69 [d. 
70 See id. at §§ 369.2(d)(5)(i)-(xviii). 
71 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(d)(5)(iii). 
U.S. contractor A is considering bidding for a contract to construct a school in boycotting 
country Y. Each bidder is required to submit copies of its annual report with its bid. Since 
A's annual report describes A's worldwide operations, including the countries in which it does 
business, it necessarily discloses whether A has business relations with boycotted country X. 
A has no reason to know that its report is being sought for boycott purposes 
[A]ccompanying the invitation to bid is a questionnaire from country Y's boycott office asking 
each bidder to supply a copy of its annual report. A may not furnish the report despite its 
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ness information is prohibited because the U.S. firm "kn[ew] that it would be 
responding to a boycott-based request for information about its business rela-
tionships .... "72 Other examples describe situations where the communication 
discloses a firm's business relationships but is not prohibited because the moti-
vation was not boycott-related. In one such example, furnishing information 
about business relationships with a boycotted country is allowed because it is 
being furnished in a normal business context and the U.S. firm does not have 
reason to know that the information is sought for boycott reasons.73 
A U.S. firm which knowingly violates any provision of the EAA or any 
regulation issued thereunder may be subject to civil and criminal penalties. 74 
The Commerce Department usually handles violations as administrative mat-
ters, aiming at consent agreements.75 In fiscal year 1983, the Office of Antiboy-
cott Compliance76 issued the most severe administrative penalties to date.'17 
[d. 
public availability because it would be furnishing information in response to a questionnaire 
from a boycott office. 
72 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(d)(5)(viii). 
[d. 
U.S. company A is asked by boycotting country Y to furnish information concerning its 
business relationships with boycotted country X. A, knowing that Y is seeking the information 
for boycott purposes, refuses to furnish the information asked for directly, but proposes to 
respond by supplying a copy of its annual report which lists the countries with which A is 
presently doing business. A does not happen to be doing business with X. A may not respond 
to Y's request by supplying its annual report, because A knows that it would be responding 
to a boycott-based request for information about its business relationships with X. 
73 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(d)(5)(xii). 
[d. 
U.S. architectural firm A responds to an invitation to submit designs for an office complex 
in boycotting country Y. The invitation states that all bidders must include information 
concerning similar types of buildings they have designed. A has not designed such buildings 
in boycotted country X. Clients frequently seek information of this type before engaging an 
architect. A may furnish this information, because this is furnishing normal business infor-
mation, in a normal context, relating to A's technical competence and professional experience. 
74 The Export Administration Act of 1979, Section II(a)(2410(a)). See also 15 C.F.R. § 387.1 ("En-
forcement") and 15 C.F.R. § 388.1 ("Administrative Proceedings"). The regulations provide that know-
ing·violations of any EAA provision are punishable by a fine of five times the exports' value or $50,000, 
or by five years imprisonment or both. [d. at § 387.1(a)(l)(i). One who willfully exports anything in 
violation of the EAA knowing that such exports will benefit a country to which exports are restricted 
will be fined up to five times the value of the exports or $1 million, which ever is greater. /d. at 
§ 387.1 (a)(l)(ii). 
75 A. LOWENFELD, supra note 2, at 373. Violations may result in administrative sanctions, including 
denial of export privileges, exclusion from practice before the International Trade Administration, 
civil penalties, and seizure of commodities or technical data. Id. at § 387. I (l)(b)(l)--(4). 
76 The Office of Antiboycott Compliance (OAC), acting under the Department of Commerce, en-
forces the provisions of the EAA prohibiting U.S. firms from complying with foreign boycotts. OFFICE 
OF EXPORT ADMIN., INT'L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, EXPORT ADMIN. ANNUAL REPORT 
FISCAL YEAR 1983, 71 (1984) [hereinafter Export Admin. Annual Report]. 
77 The Office Export Administration's annual report states that the OAC issued the two largest fines 
in the history of the program. [d. at 73. Philadelphia International Bank was fined $189,000 for failing 
to report boycott-based requests for information. Id. at 75. In addition, the OAC denied export 
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C. Legal Challenges to the EAA 
Legal chalienges7S have been raised against the EAA.79 One type of legal 
attack concerns the proper interpretation of the EAA's statutory language. In 
Dresser Industries, Inc., v. Baldridge,SO a U.S. corporation challenged the extrater-
ritorial application of export controls.8' Commentators have suggested that the 
EAA could be challenged on two other statutory grounds: the President's au-
thority to issue a blanket freeze of export licenses, and his authority to control 
international payments and financial transactions.82 
Constitutional attacks have also been raised against the EAA.83 In United States 
v. Brumage,S4 a defendant charged with exporting without having first obtained 
privileges for the first time, including denials of privileges to The Xerox Corporation and Columbia 
Pictures Industries. !d. at 74. 
78 Such challenges have been primarily made by defendants charged with violating the EAA. See, 
e.g., U.S. v. Moller-Butcher, 560 F. Supp. 550 (D. Mass. 1983) (government charged company with 
export of technological equipment without a validated license); U.S. v. Brumage, 377 F. Supp. 144 
(E.D. N. Y.1974) (government charged company with export of electrical and technological equipment 
without a validated license). 
79 Section 13(a) of the EAA generally exempts actions taken under the Act from compliance with 
portions of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 551-706, including the APA section 
which provides for judicial review. See Moyer & Mabry, Export Controls As Instruments of Foreign Policy: 
The History, Legal Issues, and Policy Lessons of 3 Recent Cases, 15 LAW & POL'y INT'L Bus. 1, 132-36 
(1983). The EAA exemption includes 5 U.S.C. § 551 (definitions), §§ 553-59 (agency actions), and 
§§ 701-06 Uudicial review). Arguably, the EAA exemption prevents a private plaintiff from challenging 
an agency's decision granting or denying an export license. See, e.g., Memorandum of Points & 
Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 25-27, Dresser Indus-
tries, Inc., v. Baldridge, No. 82-2385 (D.D.C. filed October 20, 1982), cited in Moyer & Mabry, supra, 
at 100 n.617. For facts of Dresser, see infra note 80. It is unclear, however, whether the exemption 
from judicial review prohibits constitutional challenges to statutory or regulatory provisions. 
80 549 F.Supp. 108 (D.D.C. 1982). Dresser Industries, a U.S. corporation, manufactures machinery 
for the exploration of oil and gas. Id. at 109. Dresser France, a wholly owned subsidiary of Dresser 
U.S.A., had a contract with the Soviet Union to supply gas compressors for use on the pipeline. Moyer 
& Mabry, supra note 79, at 71 n.461. The gas compressors were built in France using Dresser U.S.A. 
technology. Id. On June 22, 1982, the Commerce Department enacted regulations pursuant to section 
6 of the EAA that restricted U.S. firms' foreign subsidiaries from exporting wholly foreign-origin 
equipment and technology. Id. at 70. The restrictions included compressors built by European countries 
under licensing agreements with U.S. companies. !d. Despite these measures, companies such as 
Dresser France continued to ship goods to the Soviet Union. !d. In response, the United States 
temporarily denied these companies trade privileges. !d. Subsequently, Dresser U.S.A. and Dresser 
France filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief and a motion for a temporary restraining 
order. Id. at 72-73 nn.467-68. 
81 See Moyer & Mabry, supra note 79, at 73 (citing Motion for Temporary Restraining Order at 20-
24, Dresser Industries, Inc., v. Baldridge, No. 82-2385 (D.D.C. filed August 23, 1982)). One commen-
tator has suggested that extraterritorial application of the EAA would require statutory language "so 
clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to them or ... the intention of 
the legislature cannot otherwise be satisfied." See Vance, 18 TEX. INT'L L. J. 203, 211 (1983) (quoting 
Matter of District of Columbia Workmen's Compo Act, 554 F.2d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). The author 
argues that the EAA contains no such language authorizing extraterritorial application of its provisions 
Or implementing regulations. Id. 
82 Moyer & Mabry, supra note 79, at 100-08. 
83 See infra notes 84-99 and accompanying text. 
8< 377 F. Supp. 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). In Brumage, defendants exported electronic and technical 
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a validated license argued unsuccessfully that the EAA was void for vagueness.85 
In Dresser Industries, the plaintiff argued that the imposition of export controls 
violated its right to due process.86 Additionally, commentators have suggested 
that the EAA might be subject to constitutional attack under the "export 
clause."87 
While no free speech challenge was raised against the EAA prior to Briggs, 
such a challenge was raised against a similar statute in 1978.88 In United States 
equipment to Belgium without a validated license, knowing that the items were ultimately destined 
for East Germany and Hungary in violation of § 2405(b) and regulations in 15 C.F.R. §§ 370.3,371.3, 
372.1,387.6,399.1. 
85 Id. Brumage argued that the prohibition against exports that are to be used "for the benefit of 
any Communist-dominated nation" was overly vague. Id. at 147. Brumage argued that this language 
failed reasonably to inform individuals what conduct might be criminal under the act. !d. The court 
noted that the modern "void for vagueness" doctrine stressed two aspects of due process: fair warning 
to potential criminal offenders and sufficiently precise standards to assist a court in determining when 
a crime has been committed. Id. at 147-48. The court held that the statute was "neither vague on its 
face nor as applied in this case .... " !d. at 150-51. The court's reasoning included the presumptive 
validity of congressional statutes, Congress' broad power to regulate foreign commerce, the court's 
narrower scope of review when a party has no independent constitutional guarantee, and the willful 
nature of defendant's violation. Id. at 148-49. The court concluded that defendant's claim was 
essentially an attack on the level of discretion Congress granted the President to regulate foreign 
affairs. Id. at 150. As to this contention, the court, quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. I, 17 (1965)) noted 
that Congress "must of necessity paint with a brush broader than it customarily wields in domestic 
areas .... " Id. 
86 See Moyer & Mabry, supra note 79 at 126 (citing Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Baldridge, No. 82-
2385, 20-24 (D.D.C. filed August 24, 1982». Dresser first argued that the retroactive nature of the 
controls violated its due process rights. !d. The retroactivity stemmed from the Commerce Depart-
ment's revocation of Dresser's existing license to export to Dresser France. !d. at 72. Dresser next 
argued that the Commerce Department controls placed it in the dilemma of either violating existing 
French law requiring companies to honor existing contracts with the Soviet Union or violating the 
U.S. regulations. Id. 82, 128. 
A due process challenge to the EAA was also raised by Briggs. See Briggs (1 Stratton, 539 F. Supp. 
at 1316-17 (E.D. Wis. 1982). Briggs argued that the Commerce Department regulations were not 
reasonably related to the purposes of the EAA, and thus violated the due process rationality require-
ment. !d. 
87 Moyer & Mabry, supra note 79, at 129-32. Article I, Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution states 
simply that "[n]o Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State." U.S. CONST., art. I, 
§ 9, cl. 5. One commentator has argued that the clause was not directed exclusively at taxes, but 
embodied a larger free trade principle. See Note, Constitutionality of Export Controls, 76 YALE L. J. 200 
(1966). He argues further that the Constitutional Convention "reached a deliberate decision to prohibit 
the government from burdening the export trade in any way." !d. at 203. The Supreme Court's 
construction of the clause is consistent with this view. See, e.g., Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 
290 (1901) ("[t]he requirement of the Constitution is that exports should be free from any govern-
mental burden"); United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. I, 13 (1915) ("[t]his constitutional freedom, 
however, plainly involves more than mere exemption from taxes or duties which are laid specifically 
upon the goods themselves"). But cf U.S. v. Yoshida Int'l Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 580 (C.C.P.A. 1975) 
("[n]o one has a vested right to trade with foreign nations") Yoshida, however, is based upon Supreme 
Court cases dealing with the regulation of imports. Moyer & Mabry, supra note 79, at 131 n.791. 
88 United States v. Edler Industries, 579 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1978). 
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v. Edler Industries, Inc.,89 the defendant argued that provIsIOns of the Mutual 
Security Act of 195490 empowering the President to control the export of 
technical data violated its first amendment rights. 91 The Ninth Circuit recog-
nized defendant's "colorable claim that the First Amendment furnishes a degree 
of protection for its dissemination of technological information."92 Yet the court 
held that a broad statutory reading, which construed the Act as prohibiting the 
interchange of scientific and technological information when that information 
is without any substantial military application, "is neither necessary nor 
proper."93 Instead, the court construed the statute narrowly, as prohibiting only 
technical data which "relate[s] in a significant fashion to some item on the 
Munitions List."94 Since the court found that the federal government was em-
powered to regulate the international arms traffic and its concomitant flow of 
information,95 it held that, as construed, the Act did not violate defendant's 
free speech rights. 96 
Similarly, the court held that the licensing provisions of the Security Act were 
not an unconstitutional prior restraint on defendant's speech.97 The court also 
rejected defendant's argument that, under the first amendment, the govern-
ment may not prohibit the export of defendant's technology because it is widely 
89/d. at 520. 
90 22 U.S.C. § 1934(1970) (repealed 1976) (current version at 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1982)) [hereinafter 
cited as Security Act]. 
91 Edler, 579 F.2d at 516. 
92Id. The government has argued that such non-military, scientific and technological information 
may properly be restricted under the EAA. Moyer & Mabry, supra note 79, at 121 n.733. For example, 
the Commerce Department required scientists conducting a forum at which advanced computer 
technology would be exchanged to obtain a validated license from the Office of Export Administration. 
Id. Noting that foreign citizens were in attendance, the Department characterized the exchange of 
computer information as the export of technical data. Id. Recently, the Department of Defense (DOD) 
prohibited unclassified but militarily sensitive technical papers from being presented in an open forum. 
Electronic News, Apr. 18, 1985, at 18, col. 1. The DOD allowed the papers to be presented in a closed 
forum in which all attendees agreed not to transfer or disclose the information to foreign sources. Id. 
According to DOD officials, all future technical and professional meetings in the U.S. that feature 
militarily sensitive papers will only be open to attendees who sign Export Control DOD Technical 
Data Agreement Form No. 2345. 
One commentator argued that placing export controls upon a scientific forum was a prior restraint 
without sufficient procedures for judicial review. See Note, The Export Administration Act's Technical Data 
Regulations: Do They Violate the First Amendment?, 11 GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 563, 571 (1981). No party 
has challenged the EAA's technical data regulations on constitutional grounds. For a discussion of the 
government's possible defense to such a suit, see Moyer & Mabry, supra note 78, at 124-26. See also 
Ellicott, Trends in Export Regulation, 38 Bus. LAW. 533, 540-42 (1983); Cheh, Government Control of 
Private Ideas - Striking a Balance Between Scientific Freedom and National Security, 23 jURtMETRICS J. 1 
(1982); Greenstein, National Security Controls on Scientific Information, 23 jURIMETRICS J. 50 (1982). 
9' Edler, 579 F.2d at 520. 
94Id. 
95Id. at 521. 
96 Id. 
97Id. at 521-22. 
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distributed in the United States.98 The court held that, given the national interest 
in restricting the flow of military information, public availability of the data was 
not a constitutionally recognized defense. 99 
Recently, a U.S. corporation challenged the EAA's antiboycott provisions on 
first amendment grounds. In Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Baldridge,100 an exporter 
argued that the disclosure of one's business relationships with Israel in response 
to an Arab government's questionnaire was fully protected by the first amend-
ment. 101 
III. BRIGGS & STRATTON CORP. V. BALDRIDGE 
A. Facts 
The Briggs & Stratton Corporation is a manufacturer of engine components 
for use in the end products of other manufacturers. 102 Briggs' primary contact 
with the Arab world is through these end product manufacturers who sell their 
own goods woridwide.103 
In 1977, the Syrian government denied a Syrian distributor a license to import 
spare parts for Briggs engines. lo4 The license was refused because Briggs' name 
appeared on a blacklist. lo5 The distributor wrote Briggs, enclosing a letter from 
the Syrian Economical Department I06 which asked Briggs seven questions about 
98Id. at 522. 
ggid. 
100 Briggs & Stratton, 539 F. Supp. at 1307. 
101 Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgement at 25, Briggs & Stratton Corp., 
539 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Wis. 1982). 
102 Briggs & Stratton is the world's largest manufacturer of engines for manufacturers of powered 
equipment and locks for manufacturers of automobiles, trucks and other vehicles. BRIGGS & STRATTON 
CORPORATION, 1984 ANNUAL REPORT 16 (1984). Engines and parts provided 92 percent of Briggs' 
sales in fiscal year 1984, 14 percent of which were export sales. !d. Export sales in fiscal year 1984 
amounted to $95,708,000. Form 10-K, Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 2 (1984). The corporation estimates that sales to persons who export engines 
with Briggs components to Arab League member-states were over $15 million in the fiscal year ending 
June 30, 1980. Briggs & Stratton, 539 F. Supp. at 131!' 
Brigg's manufacturing plants are located in Wisconsin, Georgia, and West Germany. ANNUAL REPORT 
at 25. Overseas sales offices are maintained in West Germany, Norway, and New Zealand. !d. at 16. 
Principal export markets are developed countries with major lawn and garden equipment industries 
and developing countries requiring powered equipment for agricultural and marine applications. !d. 
103 Thus, Briggs would normally be brought within the Arab boycott at the tertiary level as com-
ponent supplier to an end product manufacturer who sells goods to an Arab League nation. See supra 
note 23. Here, however, Briggs was brought within the boycott as a supplier to a Syrian distributor of 
replacement parts for Briggs engines. See Briggs & Stratton, 539 F. Supp. at 1310. In order to obtain 
a license to import Briggs parts, the distributor was asked by the Syrian government to submit a 
questionnaire to Briggs to determine whether Briggs had any business relationships with Israel. Id. 
104 Briggs & Stratton, 539 F. Supp. at 1310. 
105Id. 
106 Syria's Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade. Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 9, Briggs & Stratton v. Baldridge, 539 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Wise. 1982). 
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its business relationships with Israel. 107 On November 10, 1977, Briggs answered 
all seven questions in the negative. lOB A year later, Syria denied a license to 
another Syrian importer of Briggs products. 109 The importer attributed the 
denial to the Director of the Israel Boycott Office I 10 who had advised the Syrian 
"Economical Department" to ask the importer to resubmit Briggs' answers "duly 
legalized" by an Arab diplomatic mission. 11I In a letter dated December 31, 
1978, the Syrian importer asked Briggs "to ratify your declaration . .. from 
an Arab Diplomatic Mission .... "112 This request for ratification was consistent 
with a requirement under the General Principles for Boycott of Israel. ll3 
Subsequent to its failure to return an authenticated questionnaire, Briggs was 
blacklisted. 114 The corporation maintained that the blacklisting occurred as a 
result of its failure to answer the questionnaire as requested. ll5 This result 
107 [d. Answers to the seven questions would help the Syrians determine whether to blacklist Briggs. 
108 The text of Briggs' reply (with questions as translated) is as follows: 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
The following questions have been presented by our customer [the Syrian distributor]. We 
list these questions with their answers, below: 
I. Has the company now or in the past main branch factories or combinating factories in 
Israel? 
Answer: No. 
2. Has the company now or in the past general offices in Israel for its regional or inter-
national works? 
Answer: No. 
3. Has it grant now or in the past the right of utilizing its name or trade marks or patents 
to persons or establishments or Israel works inside or outside Israel? 
Answer: No. 
4. Does it share in or own now or in the past shares in Israel works or establishments inside 
or outside Israel? 
Answer: No. 
5. Does it now or did it offer in the past any technical assistance to any Israeli work or 
establishment? 
Answer: No. 
6. Does it represent now or did it represent in the past any Israel establishment or work 
inside or outside Israel? 
Answer: No. 
7. What are the companies which it shares in or with, their nationality and the size or rate 
of this share? 
Answer: No other companies are involved. 
Brief And Appendix Of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Briggs & Stratton Corp. and Michael Hamilton, App. 
at 34, Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Baldridge, 728 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1984). 
109Id. at App. p. 35. 
II°Id. 
111 /d. at App. p. 36. 
112 Id. at App. p. 35. 
113 GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL, supra note 29, at 21 ("If the compan[y] ... desire[s] 
... to resume dealing with the Arab countries, ... [it] they must affirm [the documents'] validity 
before a notary public ... following which it must have the documents confirmed by any Arab consulate 
or embassy"). 
114 Briggs & Stratton, 539 F. Supp. at 1311. Briggs was blacklisted by Syria, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, 
Oman, and Kuwait. /d. 
1I5Id. 
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would have been consistent with the Arab League's General Principles which 
identify the refusal to respond as a basis for blacklisting a firm.116 The Com-
merce Department advised Briggs that any resubmission responsive to the 
Syrian request would have contravened the regulations. ll7 The Department 
stated that if it learned of such a contravention, it would seek to impose one or 
more of the penalties provided under the ACt. IIB 
Briggs subsequently filed suit, challenging the constitutionality of the regu-
lations. The corporation argued that the regulations violated its first amend-
ment right to free speech, 119 fifth amendment right to due process,120 and ninth 
amendment right to fundamental rights. 121 The district court granted the Com-
merce Department's motion for summary judgment. 122 Briggs moved for re-
consideration shortly thereafter, but this motion was denied. 123 An appeal was 
heard by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed the 
district court's opinion. 124 Briggs' subsequent petition for a writ of certiorari to 
the Supreme Court was denied.125 
B. Arguments and Holdings 
Before the district court, Briggs argued that its proposed act - answering a 
request for information from a Syrian distributor - was "a straightforward act 
of commercial speech" entitled to first amendment protection. 126 Briggs then 
argued that restrictions upon commercial speech must be measured by a test 
announced by the Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public 
Service Commission of New York.127 In that case, the Court stated that: 
116 GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 29, at 9. 
117 Briggs & Stratton, 539 F. Supp. at 1311. 
118 [d. at 1311-12. 
119 [d. 
120 !d. at 1316-17. Briggs argued that the prohibition against responding to boycott questionnaires 
was irrational because the boycotters would simply obtain the requested information from other sources 
and would buy a similar product from another manufacturer. Thus, Briggs argued, the regulations 
were not reasonably related to the purposes of the legislation. !d. For a discussion of the EAA's 
underlying purpose, see text accompanying notes 210-15. 
121 !d. at 1317. Briggs argued that its right to engage in international trade for profit was protected 
by the ninth amendment, which has been interpreted to protect certain fundamental rights. See Griswold 
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-99 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (arguing that certain funda-
mental rights not specifically enumerated were within penumbras of the specific guarantees of the Bill 
of Rights, with their constitutional authority in the Ninth Amendment). 
122 Briggs & Stratton, 539 F. Supp. at 1320. 
123 Briggs & Stratton, 544 F. Supp. at 668. 
124 Briggs & Stratton, 728 F.2d. at 918. 
125 Briggs & Stratton, 728 F.2d at 915, cert. denied 105 S.Ct. 106 (1984). 
126 Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment at 25-26, Briggs & Stratton v. 
Baldridge, 539 F. Supp. 1307 (E.O. Wis. 1982). 
127 [d. at 26. 
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If the communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful 
activity, the government's power is more circumscribed. The State 
must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on 
commercial speech. Moreover, the regulatory technique must be in 
proportion to that interest. The limitation on expression must be 
designed carefully to achieve the State's goal. Compliance with this 
requirement may be measured by two criteria. First, the restriction 
must directly advance the state interest involved; the regulation may 
not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support 
for the government's purpose. Second, if the governmental interest 
could. be served as well by a more limited restriction on commercial 
speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive. 128 
Briggs argued that, according to Central Hudson, the Commerce Department 
regulations prohibiting its proposed communication violated its first amendment 
right to free speech. 
The district court held, however, that the regulations did not violate Briggs' 
first amendment rights. 129 The court first noted that commercial speech was not 
entitled to full first amendment protection. 130 In applying the Central Hudson 
test, the court held that the state interest behind the antiboycott regulations was 
substantial, and that this interest was advanced by preventing the flow of infor-
mation to boycotters. I3I The court also held that the regulations were not more 
restrictive than necessary, and met the requirements of Central Hudson. 132 
Briggs moved for reconsideration, arguing that the court had failed to rule 
on whether its conventional speech rights had been violated. 133 The court held 
that it was unnecessary to resolve this issue. 134 The court reasoned that it did 
not resolve this issue in the previous case because Briggs had argued that the 
relevant issue was commercial speech. 135 The court held that, even if the con-
ventional speech issue were germane, it would "find no constitutional instru-
sion,"136 
Briggs appealed to the Seventh Circuit, arguing that its proposed answers to 
the boycott questions should be considered conventional speech and entitled to 
the full measure of protection afforded by the first amendment. 137 Briggs char-
acterized its speech as primarily concerned with promoting the truth about its 
128 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980). 
129 Briggs & Stratton, 539 F. Supp. at 1319. 
130Id. at 1318. 
131/d. at 1319. 
132 /d. 




137 Briggs & Stratton, 728 F.2d at 916. 
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business relations and influencing a foreign government's political decisions. 138 
Briggs also argued that the mere presence of economic motivation was insuf-
ficient to characterize its proposed communication as commercial. 139 The Sev-
enth Circuit held, however, that Briggs' communication was properly defined 
as commercial speech. 140 The court found that Briggs' primary concern was to 
maintain an advantageous commercial relationship, and that this placed its 
speech in the commercial category.141 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE BRIGGS DECISIONS 
A. The Characterization of Speech as Commercial or Conventional 
Generally, the first amendment prohibits the government from restricting 
expression "because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."142 
For example, in Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley,143 the Supreme 
Court struck down an ordinance which prohibited all picketing in the vicinity 
of a school, except for labor union picketing. l44 The Court held that the state 
law was not content neutral. 145 Professor Tribe, noting the Court's holding in 
Mosley, commented that "[a]ny government action aimed at communicative 
impact is presumptively at odds with the First Amendment."146 Tribe also noted 
that the Supreme Court has held unconstitutional government regulation aimed 
at ideas and information, unless the message poses a clear and present danger, 
constitutes a defamatory falsehood, or is otherwise unprotected. 147 Tribe cited 
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 148 and 
Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro l49 as "communicative impact" 
cases which should be judged according to this standard. 150 
138Id. at 917. 
139 !d. 
140 !d. at 918. 
14IId. at 917. 
142 Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
143Id. 
144Id. at 92-93. 
145 [d. at 99. 
146 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 581 (1978). 
147 [d. at 582. 
148 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (statute prohibiting dissemination of drug price information violates first 
amendment). 
149 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (ordinance prohibiting the posting of real estate "For Sale" and "Sold" signs 
violates first amendment). 
150 Commenting on Linmark, Tribe observed: 
[I]ike the ban on prescription drug price information held unconstitutional in Virginia Board 
of Pharmacy, this was a content-based prohibition on speech; like the ban in Virginia Board of 
Pharmacy, this one was not demonstrably necessary to achieve a compelling objective in no 
other manner; and, like the ban in Virginia Board, this one suffered from the independently 
fatal flaw of seeking its objective through 'restricting the free flow of truthful information.' 
!d. at 654, (quoting Linmark, 431 U.S. at 95 (1977». 
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Another commentator has noted the Court's cautious treatment of content 
based speech restrictions. 151 Stone has described content based restrictions as 
governmental action "that on its face expressly accords differential treatment 
to the expression of certain specified messages, ideas, or information."152 Stone 
cited as familiar examples Linmark and two cases where laws or injunctions 
prohibited the disclosure of certain sorts of information. 153 
In practice, content based restrictions on speech have been sustained only in 
the most extraordinary circumstances. 154 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has 
held that content-based regulation of "commercial" speech poses fewer prob-
lems "[i]n light of the greater potential for deception or confusion in the context 
of certain advertising messages .... "155 Contrary to the analyses of Tribe and 
Stone, the Court has characterized Virginia Board and Linmark as "commercial 
speech cases,"156 and has held that as such, they do not deserve the level of 
protection suggested by these commentators. Thus, a threshold issue in the 
Briggs case was whether Briggs' proposed communication is "commercial" 
speech and deserves the lower level of protection afforded by the Central Hudson 
test. 
In light of the Supreme Court's most recent commercial speech decision, 
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.,157 it appears that the lower courts mischar-
151 Stone. Restrictions of SPeech Because of Its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject Matter Restrictions. 46 
U. CHI. L. REV. 81. 82 (1978). 
152 !d. at 81 n.3. 
153Id. 
154 For cases sustaining content-based restrictions of "fully protected" expression. see Parker v. Levy, 
417 U.S. 733 (1974); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 
(1978); Zaccihini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Jones v. North Carolina 
Prisoners' Labor Union Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977). For earlier cases see Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 
315 (1951); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Schenk v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47 (1919); see Stone, 
supra note 151, at 82-83. Professor Stone notes that the Court has sustained restrictions on expression 
of obscenity, false statements of fact, and fighting words, "those special and limited categories ... that 
the Court has found to be of such low value in terms of the historical, philosophical and political 
purposes of the amendment as to be entitled to less than full constitutional protection." !d. at 82. 
155 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983). 
156 See Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 760; Linmark, 431 U.S. at 91. 
157 463 U.S. at 60 (1983). In Bolger, a manufacturer and distributor of contraceptives challenged a 
federal statute prohibiting unsolicited mailing of contraceptive advertisements. Youngs wanted to mail 
three types of materials to the public: flyers promoting many products, including prophylactics, 
available at a drug store; flyers exclusively or substantially promoting prophylactics; and informational 
pamphlets describing the desirability and availability of prophylactics generally or Youngs' products 
specifically. One of the informational pamphlets provided detailed descriptions of Trojan-brand con-
doms manufactured by Youngs. The second informational pamphlet stated at the bottom of the last 
page that "the pamplet has been contributed as a public service by Youngs, the distributor of Trojan-
brand products prophylactics." Id. at 62-63 nA. The plaintiff corporation argued that its proposed 
mailings were "fully protected" speech, and that the regulations were therefore an impermissible 
content-based restriction. Id. at 65-66. The Supreme Court held, however, that all of Youngs' pam-
phlets were "entitled to the qualified but nonetheless substantial protection accorded to commercial 
speech." /d. at 68. 
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acterized Briggs' communication as commercial. '58 In Bolger, the Court de-
scribed the core notion of commercial speech as that which does "'no more than 
propose a commercial transaction.""59 The Court also held that simply because 
pamphlets are advertisements "does not compel the conclusion that they are 
commercial speech."'60 The Court observed that "reference to a specific product 
does not by itself render the pamphlets commercial speech."'61 Furthermore, 
the Court found that economic motivation is "insufficient by itself to turn the 
materials into commercial speech."'62 The Court concluded that the combination 
of Youngs' transaction proposal, advertisement, reference to a specific product, 
and economic motivation provided strong support for the lower court's char-
acterization of Youngs' pamphlets as commercial speech. '63 
Unlike Youngs' pamphlets, Briggs' proposed communication does not pro-
pose a commercial transaction. '64 Furthermore, Briggs' reply to the Syrian 
government does not make any specific reference to its products or services. '65 
Briggs' answers also do not advertise any price or product information. 166 Thus, 
Briggs' communication does not fall within the Supreme Court's most recent 
definition of commercial speech. 
Yet eight months after the Court's Bolger decision, the Seventh Circuit held 
Briggs' speech to be commercial. 167 This demonstrates that lower courts remain 
confused about the precise meaning of commercial speech. '68 A careful exam-
'" Compare text of Briggs' communication supra note 108 with Youngs' informational pamphlets 
supra note 157. 





163 [d. The Court also stressed thai it "did not mean to suggest that each of the characteristics must 
be present in order for speech to be commercial." [d. at 67 n.l4. The Court "express[ed] no opinion 
as to whether reference to any particular product or service is a neccessary element of commercial 
speech." !d. 
164 See supra note 108. Cf Bolger, supra note 157. See also Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The 
United States Court Of Appeals For The Seventh Circuit at 10, Trane Co. v. Baldridge, 728 F.2d 915 
(7th Cir. 1984). Note that this argument was raised in the Trane Company's Petition and was adopted 
by Briggs in its separate Petition. Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of 
Appeals For The Seventh Circuit at i, Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Baldridge, 728 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 
1984). 
165 See supra note 108. 
166 [d. 
167 See Bri{;{;s & Stratton. 728 F.2d at 915. The Briggs case was decided February 24, 1984, eight 
months after Bolger was decided on June 24, 1983. 
168 Numerous commentators have noted that uncertainty pervades the commercial speech area. See, 
e.g., J. NOWAK, R. ROTVNDA, AND J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 927-28 (2d ed. 1983) (noting the 
Supreme Court's difficulty over the years in defining commercial speech); Rotunda, The Commercial 
Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976 U. ILL. L. F. 1080, I JOI (noting "the fruitless and unclear 
distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech"); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 656 (1978) (noting the "obviously troublesome distinction ... between talk for profit, and talk 
150 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. IX, No.2 
ination of commercial speech precedent, however, suggests that Briggs' com-
munication falls outside the definition of commercial speech and, as a commer-
cial actor's conventional speech, deserves full first amendment protection. 
Most, if not all, of the Supreme Court's commercial speech cases have con-
cerned advertising. I69 One commentator has equated commercial speech with 
commercial advertising,I70 dividing commercial speech cases into five separate 
categories: "[challenges against] regulations of false or deceptive advertising,I7l 
regulations of offensive advertising,172 prohibitions of commercial advertising 
in certain forums,173 prohibitions of price advertising for particular products or 
services,I74 and prohibitions of all advertising for particular products or ser-
vices."175 This commentator has also noted four related issues where factors for 
for other purposes"). But see T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
105 n.46 (1968) (noting that "[ u]p to the present, the problem of differentiating between commercial 
and other communication has not in practice proved to be a serious one"). For an example of the 
uncertainty in the courts compare Ad World, Inc. v. Township of Doylestown, 672 F.2d 1136, 1140 (3d 
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982) ("[t]he Supreme Court has confined the category of 
'commercial speech' to cases involving 'purely commercial advertising''') (quoting Pittsburgh Press, 413 
U.S. at 384) with SEC v. Lowe, 725 F.2d 892, 900 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Unlike the Third Circuit in Ad World 
... we do not believe that the Supreme Court has limited commercial speech solely to product or 
service advertising"), aiI'd on other grounds, _U.S. _(June 10, 1985). 
16Y See Briggs & Stratton, 539 F. Supp. at 1318, (citing Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 
U.S. 490 (1981) (advertisements on billboards); Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 553 (1980) (advertisements promoting consumption of electricity); Bates v. State 
Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (advertisement of legal services); Carey v. Population Services 
International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (advertisements of contraceptives); Linmark Associates, Inc. v. 
Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (posting of real estate "For Sale" and "Sold" signs); 
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (pre-
scription drug price advertising); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (advertisements of abortion 
services). See aLso Lowe, 725 F.2d at 904 (Brieant,.J., dissenting) ("[t]he concept of commercial speech 
has now been confined to naked advertising and closely related methods of commercial solicitation"); 
Ad World, 672 F.2d at 1140 (noting the Supreme Court has confined commercial speech cases to those 
involving advertising). But see Lowe, 725 F.2d at 900 (holding that the Court has not limited commercial 
speech cases solely to advertising). 
liO Comment, First Amendment Protection For Commercial Advertising: The lvew Constitutional Doctrine, 44 
U. CHI. L. REV. 20S n.1 (1976) ("Commercial advertising, or 'commercial speech,' cases have recently 
been prominent in the Supreme Court's docket.") [hereinafter cited as Comment, First Amendment 
Protection Jor Commercial Speech]. 
171 !d. at n.2, (citing Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976); FTC v. National Comm'n 
on Egg l\'utrition, 517 F.2d 485, 489 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 919 (1976). 
172 Id. (citing State v. Cardwell, 539 P.2d 169,22 Or. App. 242 (1975). 
173 Id. (citing Howard v. State Dep't of Highwavs. 478 F.2d 581 (10th Cir. 1973) (regulation of 
placement of commercial billboards)). 
174 Id. (citing Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 
748 (1976) (prescription drug price advertising); Terminal-Hudson Elecs., Inc. v. Dep't of Consumer 
Affairs, 407 F. Supp. 1075 (C.D. Cal. 1976), vacated. 426 U.S. 916 (1976) (advertising prices and places 
to purchase corrective eyeglasses)). 
175 !d. (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (abortion advertisements); Pittsburgh Press 
Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) Gob advertisements in sex-
designated columns)). 
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analyzing advertising cases also apply.176 Thus, according to this commentator, 
Briggs' speech is correctly classified as commercial speech only if it can be 
characterized as a form of advertising, or as communication raising a related 
issue appropriate for commercial speech analysis. 
Briggs' one-word answers to the boycott questionnaire do not appear to 
advertise a product or service. 177 Briggs' speech also does not seem to fall within 
any of the previously defined related issues. 178 Recently, however, the Second 
Circuit found commercial speech analysis appropriate for a fifth related issue. 
In SEC v. Lowe,179 the majority held an investment advisor's newsletter to be 
commercial speech. 180 The court justified enjoining publication of the newsletter 
by characterizing the advisor's activities as a profession, noting his criminal 
history, and concluding that his publications were "potentially deceptive com-
mercial speech."181 
176 Comment, First Amendment Protection For Commercial Advertising, supra note 170, at 206 n.15. The 
four related issues are: "the first amendment implications of governmental regulation of securities 
sales and promotion; the first amendment standard applicable in assessing governmental regulation 
of speech related to antitrust or unfair trade practices; the first amendment status of business credit 
reports; [and] the first amendment protection of credit reports on private individuals." [d. (citations 
omitted). 
177 See supra note 108. 
178 The first related issue deals with first amendment protection for a corporate press report. See, 
e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1306 (2d Cir. 1971) (court characterizing a 
corporate press report as being in the same category as corporate registration statements and pro-
spectuses). In Briggs, the letter sent to the Syrian distributor was a private communication, not intended 
for the public. See supra note 108. 
The third and fourth related issues deal with first amendment protection for credit reports. See, 
e.g., Wortham v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 633, 639 (S.D. Tex. 1975) (court held a mercantile 
reporting agency's credit reports were not entitled to any federal first amendment protection) (In 
Wortham, the agency maintained national offices and distributed credit reports to paid subscribers 
throughout the country); Millstone v. Q'Hanlon Reports, Inc., 528 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1976) (court 
held consumer credit reports were commercial speech under the Supreme Court's Bigelow decision). 
Unlike the commercial actors in these cases, Briggs is not in the business of distributing information, 
and its communication was not published for sale. See supra notes 102 and 108. At the very least, 
Briggs' speech was not issued for the commercial reasons identified by the Wortham court. 
The second related issue deals with first amendment protection for a speaker involved in unfair 
trade practices. In Holiday Magic, Inc. v. Warren, 357 F. Supp. 20 (E.D. Wis. 1973), vacated, 497 F.2d 
687 (7th Cir. 1974), the plaintiff was promoting an illegal pyramid distribution scheme. Plaintiff 
argued that, as mere promotion, it was entitled to full first amendment protection. !d. at 24. However, 
the court held that the plaintiff did more than merely advocate the scheme, but also invited partici-
pation, organized, advertised, and implemented the prohibited activity. [d. at 24-26. Similarly, Briggs 
was seeking first amendment protection for an illegal trade practice (furnishing information about its 
business relationships with a friendly boycotted country to a boycotter, prohibited by the EAA). 
However, unlike the plaintiff in Holiday Magic, Briggs' speech was not "solicitation designed to obtain 
... immediate financial participation." Holiday Magic, 357 F. Supp. at 26. Briggs' letter does not solicit 
the Syrian distributor or the Syrian government, it merely responds to a request to identify itself. See 
supra note 108. 
179 725 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'd on other grounds, _U.S. _(june 10, 1985). 
180 !d. at 90 I. 
181 !d. at 900-0 I. 
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Many suits analyzed as commercial speech cases have involved professions 
and the possible deception of the public. 1s2 Yet in Briggs, the speaker was not a 
professional,Is3 and its letter was not in a position to deceive the U.S. public. Is4 
Briggs' communication was not aimed at U.S. consumers, but at a foreign 
sovereign. Is5 Thus, Briggs' expression does not fall within the related issue 
raised in Lowe. 
The Seventh Circuit in Briggs did not characterize Briggs' speech as advertis-
ing. Is6 The court did not find that Briggs' speech fell within any established 
related issue. IS7 Instead, the court issued a broad holding that communication 
which pertains to commercial transactions is commercial speech. ISS While the 
Supreme Court held in Bolger that the essence of commercial speech was that 
it only proposed a commercial transaction,Is9 the Seventh Circuit in Briggs ruled 
that "[t]he hallmark of commercial speech is that it pertains to commercial 
transactions, whether those proposed through product advertising ... or im-
plicated in some other manner."190 
Under the Seventh Circuit's broad definition of commercial speech, any ac-
tivity which pertains to or implicates a commercial transaction deserves a lower 
level of first amendment protection. Since a commercial actor's speech is usually 
referable to some type of commercial transaction, such actors would never 
receive the higher level of protection afforded conventional speech. According 
to the Seventh Circuit, a commercial actor's economic interests dwarf any ac-
companying interest in promoting the truth about its business activities. l9l This 
broad formulation is at odds with Supreme Court decisions granting full first 
amendment protection to persons whose expression is merely related to their 
commercial activity.I92 Briggs argued in its Petition for Writ of Certiorari that 
182 See, e.g., Virginia Board, 425 U.S. 748 (pharmacists); Bates, 433 U.S. 350 (lawyers); Friedman v. 
Rogers, 440 U.S. I (1979) (optometrists). Yet Briggs was not involved in a profession, and was not in 
a position to deceive the public. See supra notes 102 and 108. Its communication was aimed at a 
sovereign government, not U.S. consumers. See supra note 108. 
183 See supra note 102. 
184 Briggs' communication did not involve American citizens. See supra notes 104-13 and accom-
panying text. 
185Id. 
186 See Briggs & Stratton, 728 F.2d at 915-18. 
187Id. 
188Id. at 917. 
189 Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66, (citing Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 385 (1973». 
190 Briggs & Stratton, 728 F.2d at 917-18. 
191 See Briggs & Stratton, 728 F.2d at 917, where the court rejected Briggs' argument that its interest 
in answering the questionnaire was to promote the truth about its business relationships. 
192 "Commercial gain is no doubt the primary purpose of many involved in labor disputes and of 
innumberable authors, journalists, dramatists and others who earn their livelihood through expression 
that is unquestionably entitled to First Amendment protection." Holiday Magic, 357 F. Supp. at 25, 
(citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); Cf Bantam 
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963». 
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a broad spectrum of speech would be denied constitutional protection under 
the Seventh Circuit's holding. 193 
B. The Constitutional Standard for Government Restriction of Commercial Speech 
Assuming that Briggs' communication was commercial speech, the next issue 
raised by Briggs is whether the district court correctly applied the Central Hudl'On 
commercial speech standard. Before applying this test, the district court in 
Briggs examined pre-Central Hudson commercial speech cases. The court's review 
of these past Supreme Court decisions was pronounced. 194 While a review of 
prior decisions is often useful in distilling appropriate legal principles, in Briggs 
it was unnecessary; the Supreme Court had already devised a specific test for 
determining the constitutionality of government restraints on commercial 
speech. 195 The district court did not criticize the Central Hudson test for omitting 
or distorting prior precedent. Thus, the court's consideration of pre-Central 
Hudson decisions appears to have been unnecessary. 
The district court's discussion of pre-Central Hudson precedent creates the 
impression that Briggs' claim is weak. For example, the court referred to a 
single footnote from a pre-Central Hudson case which recognized the "relative 
novelty of First Amendment protection for such speech."I96 The court also 
included a pre-Central Hudson warning that courts "act with caution in confront-
ing First Amendment challenges to economic legislation that serves legitimate 
regulatory interests."197 The court deduced that this warning must be heeded 
because of the context in which Briggs' claim arose.lg8 Here, the district court 
suggests that Briggs' claim is out of place because it challenges a statute which 
only bars the flow of information concerning business relationships with a 
boycotted country, not the flow of price and product information to purchasers 
of Briggs products. 199 
193 Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The U.S. Court Of Appeals For The Seventh Circuit, at 8, 
Trane Company v. Baldridge, 728 F.2d 915 (1984). Briggs argued: "Examples of speech which the 
government might then suppress include protests of contractors to the boycott of the Soviet pipeline, 
comments of grain producers about restrictions on grain exports, [and] contributions of manufacturers 
to the tariff and free-trade debate .... " [d. 
194 Briggs & Stratton, 539 F. Supp. at 1317-19. The opinion contains five paragraphs on pre-Central 
Hudson decisions and five invoking and applying the Central Hudson test. Cf Trane, 552 F. Supp. 1378 
(w.n. Wis. 1983), where the court devoted nine paragraphs to its Central Hudson inquiry and none to 
prior cases. 
195 See Trane, 552 F. Supp. 1378 (w.n. Wis. 1983), where the court held plaintiff's answers to a 
boycott questionnaire to be commercial speech without any comment on pre-Central Hudson precedent. 
196 Briggs & Stratton, 539 F. Supp. at 1318, (quoting Friedman, 440 U.S. 1, 10-11 n.9). 
197 !d. 
198 Briggs & Stratton, 539 F. Supp. at 1318. 
199 !d. The court seemed to hold that a commercial speech claim is only appropriate in the latter 
context. See id. 
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These prefatory remarks detract from what should be a focused, rigorous 
application of the Central Hudson test. Nothing in Central Hudson states that 
relative novelty should be part of a court's reason for decision. Furthermore, 
the court failed to follow a Supreme Court precedent that one who restricts 
speech has the burden of justifying it. 2oO The court's decision to act with caution 
when confronted with a first amendment challenge appears to shift this burden 
to the party seeking first amendment protection. Further, one can argue that 
the Central Hudson test accurately reflects the amount of caution the Supreme 
Court deemed appropriate. Finally, the court's finding that Briggs' claim is out 
of place is irrelevant to the Central Hudson inquiry; as long as the communication 
is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity, it falls within first amend-
ment protection. 201 
Ultimately, the district court's commentary on pre-Central Hudson decisions 
affected its application of the Central Hudson test to Briggs' claim. For example, 
the district court did not address any of the issues presented by the first part 
of the Central Hudson test. Initially, the test requires the court to determine if 
the communication is misleading or related to unlawful activity and therefore 
undeserving of commercial speech protection.202 The district court issued only 
the unresponsive finding that if Briggs' proposed communication was "a subject 
only marginally affected with First Amendment concerns," then it could be 
subject to regulation. 203 This fmding does not address the first element of the 
Central Hudson test. The court did not examine whether Briggs' proposed com-
munication was misleading or related to an unlawful activity. Rather, it contin-
ued to address concerns raised in its prefatory remarks: the marginal applica-
bility of the First Amendment to Briggs' speech, and the legitimacy of state 
regulation of such conduct. 204 
The district court directly addressed the second part of the Central Hudson 
test, which calls for an inquiry into the substantiality of the government's inter-
est. The court held that the state's interest was substantial. 205 Yet the court failed 
to examine and define carefully the governmental interest at stake.206 Thus, the 
court's holding of substantiality should be questioned. 
200 Bolger, 463 U.S. at 7l. 
201 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. 
202Id. 
203 Briggs & Stratton, 539 F. Supp. at 1319, (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 
459 (1978». 
204Id. at 1318-19. 
2GSId. at 1319. 
206 But cf Dresser, 549 F. Supp. at 110, where the district court carefully analyzed the government's 
interest. The court described U.S. regulations on the export of goods and technology to the Soviet 
Union as "part of a major foreign policy exercise." Id. The court found that the purpose behind the 
foreign policy action was to effectuate the U.S. response to events in Poland declared unacceptable by 
President Reagan. Id. The court held that the United States had a "grave interest" in enforcing these 
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The district court began by noting that delicate foreign policy questions were 
involved.207 Standing alone, however, it is doubtful that the mere existence of 
foreign policy questions justifies governmental speech restrictions. 20B In its at-
tempt to identify a specific foreign policy goal of the government, the court 
quoted from the Senate Report, noting "the interest of the government in 
forestalling attempts by foreign governments to 'embroil American citizens in 
their battle against others by forcing them to participate in actions which are 
repugnant to American values and traditions.'''209 
The government's interest, as expressed in the Senate Report, is vague and 
undefined. The statement that the government has an interest in preventing 
U.S. persons from being forced to take actions "repugnant to American values 
and traditions"2IO invites further inquiry. First, one may ask whether, in fact, 
any U.S. person has been forced or coerced into compliance with the Arab 
boycott. Many firms have chosen to preserve their business relationships with 
Israel despite losing a significant amount of Arab business.211 Further, many 
firms have been able to continue doing business with Arab nations despite 
continued business ties to Israel.212 In Briggs, the parties stipulated that Briggs 
intends to trade with persons in Israel in the future and to conduct its business 
without regard to the Arab League's General Principles.213 In sum, the district 
regulations "which are, in [the government's] view, essential to the accomplishment of important 
foreign policy objectives." Id. (citation omitted). Further. the court held that plaintiff's requested relief 
would inure "to the potentially serious detriment of the United States." /d. The court concluded that 
such relief was not in the public interest, and that plaintiff's rights could be protected within the 
administrative process without interfering with U.S. foreign policy concerns. Id. 
207 Briggs & Stratton, 539 F. Supp. at 1319. 
208 Cf Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) ("[S]imply because a statute deals with foreign relations 
[does not mean that Congress] can grant the Executive totally unrestricted freedom of choice."). See 
also L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 252-53 (1972), commenting that no "partic-
ular exercise of foreign affairs power [is] exempt from limitations in favor of individual rights." Id. at 
253. Further, Henkin comments that the first amendment freedoms, in addition to being free from 
congressional abridgement, "are equally safe from infringement by treaty, Executive agreement or 
action, or court order." Id. at 254. Henkin notes that this proposition is generally assumed despite the 
absence of a "clear holding by the Supreme Court, and no discussion of the issue as it relates to foreign 
affairs." Id. at 486 n. 7. 
209 Briggs & Stratton, 539 F. Supp. at 1319, (quoting S. Rep. No. 104, 94th Cong., lst Sess. 21 (1977)). 
210 /d. 
211 See A. LOWENFELD, supra note 2, at 319-21. For example, Ford Motor Company was barred from 
making sales to any of the boycotting nations after choosing to build an assembly plant in Israel. Id. 
at 319. RCA declined 10 terminate a distribution arrangement in Israel and lost $9 million in business 
with the Arab world. Id. at 320. 
212 See Williams, supra note 22, at 821. For example, the Arab League allows members to buy military 
equipment from the same U.S. companies that provide weapons to Israel. Id. In addition, international 
hotel chains, other public service companies, tourist related firms, pharmaceutical companies, and 
manufacturers of unavailable spare parts maintain trade with the Arab world despite being blacklisted. 
/d. 
213 Brief In Support of Plaintiffs Motion For Summary Judgment at 12, Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. 
Baldridge, 539 F. Supp. 1307 (E.n. Wis. 1982) (Stipulation No. 21). Briggs' statement is understandable 
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court failed to show that coercion exists and that the government has a sub-
stantial interest in curtailing it. 
Absent coercion, one may ask what U.S. ideals are In danger. The district 
court failed to define these ideals with any particularity. In seeking the EAA's 
underlying U.S. tradition or value, one might examine the EAA's statutory 
language. The EAA's declaration of policy states that "[ilt is the policy of the 
United States to oppose ... boycotts ... imposed by foreign countries against 
other countries friendly to the United States .... "214 This statutory policy of 
opposition includes requiring "United States persons ... to refuse to take ac-
tions, including furnishing information ... which have the effect of furthering 
or supporting the ... boycotts .... "215 Thus, The EAA's langauge seems to 
support one governmental interest: preventing U.S. persons from becoming 
involved in boycotts against nations friendly to the United States. 
In Briggs, the friendly nation is Israel, and a U.S. tradition of support for 
Israel appears to exist. 216 Yet one court has ruled that a U.S. tradition of support 
for one group of people was outweighed by other governmental interests.217 
Furthermore, one commentator has argued that the substantiality of the gov-
ernment's interest in restricting speech "depends on the gravity of the harm 
the state is seeking to avert and the likelihood of its occurrence."218 For example, 
prohibiting the transfer of information concerning a destructive weapon to a 
terrorist group during wartime would be a substantial government interest, 
while prohibiting the transfer of freely available data having peaceful applica-
because trade with Israel does not always result in loss of Arab business. See Williams, supra note 22, 
at 821. See also supra note 30. 
214 The Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503, codified at 50 USc. 
§ 2402(5)(A) (1982). 
'" [d. at § 2402(5)(B). 
216 See 13 Weekly Compo Pres. Docs. 898 (1977) for President Carter's remarks on signing tbe Export 
Administration Amendments of 1977 into law ("My concern about foreign boycotts, stemmed, of 
course, from our special relationship with Israel. as well as from the economic, military and security 
needs of both our countries."). 
217 See, e.g., Adams V. Vance, 570 F.2d 9S0 (D.C. Cir. 1977), denying Eskimo's request for an 
injunction against government interference with their whale hunting, despite a U.S. trust obligation 
recognizing Eskimo whaling rights established by statute since 1884, Congressional intent to preserve 
the U.S. obligation, and Department of Interior officials' statements that the trust obligations required 
an objection. [d. at 956, 953, 955 n.11. Here, the court held that these governmental interests were 
outweighed by the government's interest in observing the International Whaling Commission's decision 
in July, 1977, eliminaling the Eskimo's subsistence hunting exemption. [d. at 952, 956 n.13. The court 
held that U.S. objection to the Commission's action would jeopardize the U.S. government's attempt 
to conserve whales under the proposed renegotiation of the International Whaling Convention. [d. at 
956 n.13. 
218 Alexander, Preserving High Technology Secrets: National Security Controls On University Research [3 
Teaching, 15 LAW & POL'y INT'L Bus. 173,205 (1983) (citing Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951)). 
This standard is usually applied in conventional speech analysis, though apparently not adopted by 
the Supreme Court in commerical speech cases. See supra note 147. In his article, Alexander deals 
with freedom of speech in tbe transfer of technical data in the university setting. See Alexander, supra. 
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tions would not. 219 The commentator noted that "[t]he category of least harmful 
information would include data transfers with foreign policy implications."22o 
Another commentator has argued for a sliding scale approach, commenting 
that the EAA presents the weakest case for government export controls because 
much of the restricted goods and data have broad civilian uses which do not 
threaten national security.221 In Briggs, the court did not find that if Briggs were 
permitted to answer the questionnaire, U.S. national security would be jeopar-
dized. 222 The court did not hold that allowing Briggs to communicate with its 
Syrian distributor was likely to cause harm to IsraeJ.223 
The district court tried to bolster its reasoning by weighing the government's 
interest with the marginal applicability of the first amendment to Briggs' claim. 
Yet the conclusion that the government's interest "outweigh[s] the marginal 
applicability of the first amendment"224 is inappropriate. The applicability of 
the first amendment is supposed to be measured only by the first element of 
the Central Hudson test. 225 If the expression is truthful and concerns lawful 
activity, it falls within the amendment's constitutional protection.226 
The district court's balancing approach resembles the commercial speech test 
announced in 1975 in Bigelow v. Virginia. 227 In Bigelow, the Supreme Court held 
that the government's power to restrict commercial speech containing "factual 
material of clear 'public interest'" depended upon a weighing of the speech's 
219Id. at 206. 
220 !d. at 207. But see Dresser. 549 F. Supp. at 110 (noting the government's grave interest in prohibiting 
exports of goods and technology to the Soviet Union). 
221 See Greenstein. National Security Controls on Scientific Information. 23 ]URIMETRICS J. 50, 82-83 
(1982). quoted in Moyer & Mabry. supra note 79, at 123 n.741. For the shortcomings of export 
restrictions as a foreign policy tool generally. see Donovan, The Export Administration Act of 1979: Refining 
U.S. Export Control Machinery, 4 B.C. INT'L & COMPo L. REV. 77, 91 (1981); Comment, The Export 
Administration Act of 1979: Latest Statutory Resolution of the "Right To Export" Versus National and Foreign 
Policy Controls, 19 COLUM. J. TRANsNAT'L L. 255, 293-97 (1981). 
222 Cf Haig V. Agee, 453 U.S. 280. 308 (1981), where the Court held petitioner's speech "jeopardized 
the security of the U.S .... [and created] serious problems for American foreign relations and foreign 
policy." Id. In Haig, Philip Agee, a former CIA official, went abroad and repeatedly disclosed intelli-
gence operations and names of intelligence personnel. 1d. at 284-85. The Court held that the Passport 
Act of 1926, authorizing the revocation of Agee's passport - resting in part on the content of his 
speech - did not violate Agee's first amendment rights. Id. at 308. 
223 Contrarily, both parties stipulated that Briggs intended to trade with Israel in the future and to 
disregard the Arab boycott. See supra note 30. Cf Dresser, 549 F. Supp. at 110, where the district court 
explicitly stated that permitting Dresser to ship restricted goods would "serve to benefit them ... to 
the potentially serious detriment of the United States." [d. 
224 Briggs & Stratton, 539 F. Supp. at 1319. 
225 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. 
226 !d. 
227421 U.S. 809, 822, 826 (1975). Bigelow was the managing editor of a Virginia newspaper. The 
paper displayed advertisements of a for-profit New York abortion referral service. Both abortions and 
for-profit medical referral services were illegal in Virginia, but legal in New York. Bigelow was 
convicted for violating a statute making it illegal to "encourage or prompt the procuring of an 
abortion." [d. at 812-13. 
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first amendment value against the government's police power interest. 228 Yet 
this approach was abandoned by the Supreme Court in Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.229 The district court's use of a 
balancing test provides additional evidence that factors other than Central Hud-
son affected its decision. In sum, one can argue that the Seventh Circuit should 
not have affirmed the district court's opinion without some inquiry into the 
substantiality of the government's interest. 
The court's failure to identify a specific foreign policy goal may have resulted 
from a fear of operating outside its judicial competence.230 The idea that certain 
legal questions are beyond a court's competence and therefore nonjusticiable is 
contained in the political question doctrine.231 Yet courts have had difficulty in 
precisely defining which types of cases present nonjusticiable political questions. 
In Baker v. Carr,232 the Supreme Court held that any case involving a political 
question exhibits one of six characteristics: 
(a) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment to a coor-
dinate political department; b) a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it; c) the impossibility of decid-
ing without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-
judicial discretion; d) the impossibility of a court's undertaking in-
dependent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due 
coordinate branches of government; e) an unusual need for un-
questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or f) 
the potentiality of embarassment from multifarious pronouncments 
by various departments on one question. 233 
228 [d. 
229 Note, Constitutional Protection oJ Commercial Speech, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 720, 726-30 (1982). 
230 See Briggs [3 Stratton, 539 F. Supp. at 1319 ("The state interest ... involv[es] delicate foreign 
policy questions .... "). When the Supreme Court has addressed the issue of justiciability, it has used 
similar language. See, e.g .. U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) ("[T]he very 
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President ... in the field of foreign relations."); See also 
C. [3 S. Air Lines v. Waterman Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948). In this case, the Court stated: 
[T]he very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial .... They 
are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be 
undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or 
imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitUde, facilities 
nor responsibility and which has long been held to belong in the domain of political power 
not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry. 
[d. at Ill. 
231 In its broadest formulation, the doctrine suggests that certain subject matter is inappropriate for 
judicial consideration. Nowak, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 107 (1983). However, Professor Tribe has com-
mented that the political question doctrine is in a state of confusion, containing strands of at least 
three different theories. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7 n.l (1978). 
232 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
233 [d. at 217. 
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A more recent Supreme Court decision appeared to reduce Baker's six factors 
to three.234 
The Briggs case arguably calls into question many of the Baker factors. Yet 
the confused state of the doctrine makes it difficult to say if the district court 
should have refrained from reviewing Briggs. For example, an important dictum 
in Baker noted that not every political case or controversy is beyond judicial 
comprehension. 235 Furthermore, Professor Scharpf has commented that where 
individual rights are at stake, the doctrine will not be applied.236 Another com-
mentator has argued that the divergency of political question doctrine inter-
pretations means that lower court judges are free to interpret the doctrine as 
they wish.237 
The district court did not address whether the foreign policy concerns raised 
by the government were substantial enough to prevent review of the case. The 
court did find, however, that these concerns were substantial enough to qualify 
as a substantial government interest. Yet the court did not define the point at 
which a foreign policy interest, sufficiently substantial for Central Hudson pur-
poses, crosses the threshold and becomes nonjusticiable. In sum, the court's 
analysis of substantiality suffers from reliance upon the Senate Report's vague 
language, and a failure to identify a specific foreign policy interest. 
The court's analysis of the last two Central Hudson factors was affected by its 
analysis of the other two factors. The third Central Hudson factor requires that 
the restriction directly advance the state interest involved.238 The regulation 
may not be sustained if it provides "ineffective or remote support for the 
government's purpose."239 As the court observed, the regulations directly ad-
vance the interest in "prevent[ing] American companies from being used as 
agents of the boycotting countries and ... in keeping Americans out of the 
boycott struggle."240 The success of the Commerce Department's Office of An-
tiboycott Compliance likely meets the Central Hudson criteria of providing more 
than ineffective or remote support for these governmental purposes.241 These 
234 Goldwater v. Carter, 444 u.s. 996, 998 (1979) (Powell, J .. concurring) (plurality opinion). 
235 369 U.S. at 211. 
236 Scharpf, Judicial Review And The Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 583, 584 
(1966). 
237 Gordon, American Courts, International Law, and 'Political Questions' Which Touch International Rela-
tions, 14 INT'L LAW. 297, 315 (1980) ("[L]ower court judges are safe in the knowledge that their 
construction ... is unlikely to conflict with a clear holding by the Supreme Court .... ") /d. 
238 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 564. 
239Id. 
240 Briggs & Stratton, 539 F. Supp. at 1319. 
241 EXPORT ADMIN. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 76. 290 investigations were completed by the OAC 
during fiscal year 1983, compared with 124 during fiscal year 1982. /d. at 73. In 53 cases, the OAC 
reached settlements and imposed fines totalling $1,378,750, compared with 43 settlements and the 
imposition of fines totalling $548,750 in fiscal year 1982. Id. 
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purposes are only relevant, however, if they qualify as a substantial government 
intere,t. If the government's only substantial interest is support of Israel, the 
court must inquire whether the regulations preventing Briggs from responding 
to a boycott questionnaire effectively supports Israel. 
Moreover, the efficacy of the regulations in preventing information from 
flowing to boycotters is doubtful. The parties in Briggs argued that some of the 
information called for in the questionnaire was publicly available from other 
sources.242 For example, information regarding the location of Briggs' plants 
and general offices can be gleaned from its Annual Report. 243 Questions re-
garding its trademarks, patents, and ownership of property can be procured 
from various government agencies. The ability of boycotters to obtain desired 
information in spite of the regulations undercuts the court's argument that the 
regulations directly advance the interest in stopping the flow of information to 
Arab governments. 
Finally, the court addressed the fourth Central Hudson factor, inquiring 
whether the government's interest could be served by a more limited restriction 
on commercial speech. 244 If so, "the excessive restrictions cannot survive."245 
Here, the district court argued that if the regulations were narrowed to prohibit 
only valuable information and information not publicly available, it would be 
"a difficult, if not impossible regulatory task" which would end up "frustrating 
the governmental interest."246 
The court's analysis of the fourth factor, however, is incomplete. It is the 
government's burden to show a more limited restriction on speech is impractic-
able or unavailable.247 In Central Hudson, the Court struck down a state regu-
lation which prohibited an electric utility from advertising to promote the use 
of electricity.248 The Court held that the regulation suppressed speech "that in 
no way impair[ed] the State's interest in energy conservation .... "249 The Court 
suggested that less restrictive means of furthering the state's energy policy 
existed. One such means would require that advertisements include information 
about the relative efficiency and expense of the offered service. 250 
In Briggs, however, the district court did not inquire whether the Commerce 
Department had shown that no less restrictive alternatives existed. Instead, the 
242 See Brief In Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment at 32, Briggs & Stratton, 539 
F. Supp. at 1307. 
243 See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 102, at 25. 
244 Briggs & Stratton, 539 F. Supp. at 1319. 
245 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. 
246 Briggs & Stratton, 539 F. Supp. at 1319. 
2.7 See supra note 200. 
2.8 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557. 
249Id. at 570. 
250Id. at 571. 
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court merely suggested that one alternative - narrowing the scope of the 
regulations - would be difficult. The court did not consider whether the 
government could oppose the Arab boycott in ways that would leave a U.S. firm 
free to communicate with a boycotting nation. One could argue that the gov-
ernment's interest could be better served by means that did not restrict a 
commercial actor's free speech at all. For example, the U.S. government could 
refuse to trade with various Arab countries. Such trade restrictions would be 
an in-kind response to the Arab boycott of Israel, a clear show of support for 
Israel, and would preserve a two hundred year tradition of controlling U.S. 
exports in peacetime.251 More importantly, the foreign policy would not entail 
a restriction on free speech. While politicians may not consider this form of less 
restrictive alternative appropriate, courts should account for such alternatives 
in deciding the constitutionality of speech restrictions. In Briggs, however, the 
district court failed to examine these types of less restrictive alternatives. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Briggs' petition for writ of certiorari presented the Supreme Court with the 
opportunity to define precisely "commercial speech." The Court could have 
addressed the unique question of whether conventional speech, arising in a 
commercial context and primarily motivated by economic self-interest, deserved 
a lower level of first amendment protection. Unlike nearly every previous Su-
preme Court case, Briggs' proposed communication did not involve advertising. 
Further, Briggs' speech did not promote a product or service or propose a 
commercial transaction, factors present in most, if not all, previous cases. Finally, 
Briggs' communication did not appear to raise any related issues appropriate 
for commercial speech analysis established by courts or commentators. 
Briggs' petition also presented the Court with the opportunity to review the 
lower courts' holdings. For example, the Court might have inquired whether 
the Seventh Circuit's holding was correct that the hallmark of commercial speech 
is that it merely pertains to commercial transactions. Since the Court had held 
eight months earlier that the core notion of commercial speech was expression 
which did no more than propose a commercial transaction, such a review was 
appropriate. In addition, the Court might have inquired whether the district 
251 Moyer & Mabry, supra note 79, at 4 n.S. The commentators cited the colonies' boycotts of British 
goods carrying special taxes. [d. An alternative to a U.S. boycott of Arab goods would be a policy of 
denying export licenses for non-communicative U.S. goods. In the past seven years, the U.S. has 
controlled its own exports on ten different occasions to express opposition to other countries' policies. 
!d. at 4-5. Examples of such restrictions include: shipments of wheat, corn, stuffed Misha bears, 
teeshirts, blue jeans and frozen chickens to the Soviet Union in response to the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan; exports of crime control equipment to Uganda in response to human rights violations; 
and exports of certain aircraft to Iraq, South Yemen, Libya, and Syria in response to their support 
for terrorism. [d. at 5-7 nn.13-23. 
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court correctly applied the Central Hudson test to Briggs' communication. In 
light of the district court's significant use of pre-Central Hudson precedent, and 
its cursory examination of the government's interest, such an inquiry would 
have been valuable. 
Finally, the Briggs case presented the Court with the opportunity to discuss 
broader commercial speech issues. For example, the Court might have ad-
dressed whether the Central Hudson test was meant for all types of commercial 
speech. Perhaps the Central Hudson test is best reserved for commercial speech 
involving advertising and promotion of commercial sales and transactions. If 
SO, the Court might have discussed whether a different standard is required for 
communication merely arising in a commercial context, and created a new 
standard for "secondary" commercial speech. Further, the Court might have 
discussed the types of governmental interests that qualify as substantial, and 
whether implication of a foreign policy is sufficient in itself, without examina-
tion, to outweigh an individual's commercial speech interest. 
David Cain 
